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In this paper I give a tentative assessment of the methodological sta-
tus of agent based simulations. I ﬁrst show under which conditions
ABS can be a complement to traditional modelling. I then consider
whether they can be held as a sound methodology of their own. Var-
ious topics relevant to the argument are brieﬂy discussed, such as
the forecasting role of theories, the realism of assumptions, Hayek’s
insights on economics methodology. I cast the arguments given into
some results of modern theory of abductive inference, providing a
framework that helps clarify the logical status of simulations, and
gives some hints on how to foster their role as a self sustained tool
for economic reasoning.1 Introduction
According to Hempel, scientiﬁc explanation of a phenomenon con-
sists in its reconduction to a general law1. Monetarist explanation
of inﬂation is an example, in that it ascribes inﬂation to the ”law”,
stating that every monetary expansion will end up in a rise of the
aggregate price index. In this view, the core of scientiﬁc endeavour
is the discovering of new laws, the building of new theorems.
In this view, agent-based simulations can not stay at the core
of scientiﬁc endeavour, since they do not provide us with theorems.
The generalisation of their results, indeed, conﬂicts with the impos-
sibility of spanning numerically the domain of all relevant variables
and parameters. In a sense, a simulation provides us with just anec-
dotic evidence2.
Reducing our ambitions, we could ﬁnd a role for simulations in
their use as a laboratory. Social scientists sometimes complain the
fact that they can not test hypotheses under controlled conditions.
Could simulations do that job? Strictly speaking, one should answer
no. To bring a consumer into a laboratory to study its behaviour is
a matter of experimental economics: Into a personal computer you
can bring just the model of a consumer.
Let us reduce again our ambitions, and ask ourselves wether a
simulation can be seen as a mean to explore in a laboratory-like
manner some ﬁeld of interest, using models as a surrogate of the
actors involved. This time the answer is yes. It should be noted,
however, that this is the same kind of activity a researcher does
when he takes his pencil and tries to put together various equations
— various models of the actors he is studying. With two diﬀerences:
handling a pencil is easier, and if you have the good luck of arriving
to a nice result, that result will resemble to a theorem, to a ”piece”
of science.
Certainly, if this were the ”true” picture, it wouldn’t be very
encouraging. Fortunately, the argument sketched is not that sound,
1The so called deductive-nomological, or ”covering-law” view of scientiﬁc explanation. The
main references are Hempel and Oppenhaim (1948) and Hempel (1965, 1966). Deductive-
nomological explanations of an explanandum E are ”deductive arguments whose conclusion is
the explanandum sentence E, and whose premiss-set, the explanans, consists of general laws
and of other statements which make assertions about particular facts” (Hempel 1966, p. 51).
2For the sake of readability I will hereafter use ”simulation”, ”agent-based simulation” and
”agent-based model” interchangeably.
1mainly in one point: It rests of a view of scientiﬁc explanation that
— particularly in social sciences — calls for many reﬁnements3.
As a matter of fact, agent-based simulations are diﬀusing in many
disciplines, from biology, to chemistry, to economics. Provided that
this, in turn, is not a sound evidence of their value, I will give in this
paper some arguments on the importance they can have in economic
reasoning.
To set up the stage, I will start with few words on the origin and
deﬁnition of agent-based simulations. This will help me to assess
a ﬁrst case — a ”light” one — in which simulations provide a sure
added value to the scholar.
I then proceed showing why agent-based computational economics
(ACE) has to be considered as a sound methodology of its own. The
line of reasoning has three steps. First, I will clarify (one of) the
arguments upon which the covering-law view of scientiﬁc explana-
tion misses some speciﬁcities of economic research. Next, I will show
how ACE can be useful in tackling with these speciﬁcities. Finally,
I will generalise the intuitions given in ﬁrst two steps, proposing a
tentative assessment of their methodological status.
2 Basic features of agent-based modelling and
computation
Agent-based computational economics is a recently established ﬁeld
of research whose lineage is twofold. From one side, it is a derivation
of computational economics, quite similar in its philosophy to the
pioneering studies on microsimulations. Epstein and Axtell, tracing
back the origins of the agent-based approach in social sciences, quote
an interesting passage of Orcutt et al., that at the beginning of the
Sixties deﬁned this way their main concern:
Our socioeconomic system is a complicated structure containing mil-
lions of interacting units, such as individuals, households, and ﬁrms.
It is these units which actually make decisions about spending and
3As a matter of fact, the deductive-nomological view of scientiﬁc explanation today is far
from being the ”received view” in the philosophy of science literature. A detailed reconstruc-
tion of the debate on the ”crisis” of the D-N model and on the alternative views of scientiﬁc
explanation can be found in Salmon (1988). A survey of the many reﬁnements and/or alter-
natives approaches that have been proposed in economics is out of my scope. Many insights,
however, can be found in Antiseri (1997), where there is an up to date discussion dealing with
the peculiarities of social enquiry.
2saving, investing and producing, marrying and having children. It
seems reasonable to expect that our predictions would be more
successful if they were based on knowledge about these elemental
decision-making units — how they behave, how they respond to
changes in their situations, and how they interact.4
From the other side, ACE exploits a technology with a much more
”complex” lineage, in that it combines elements of many ﬁelds rang-
ing from cellular automata, to genetic algorithms, to artiﬁcial intel-
ligence, to artiﬁcial life. During the last two decades, the boost in
computers’ power and the diﬀusion of programming languages with
an object-oriented architecture5, provided the tools for a widespread
exploitation of this technique within the broad ﬁeld of studies usu-
ally labelled as complexity sciences.
As regards their origins, then, agent-based simulations are far
from being a peculiarity of economic research — the so-called ”eco-
nomics imperialism” here is not in action. The same can be said
about the advancements they promise. As a matter of fact, one of
the most appealing features of this methodology for the social scien-
tist is the possibility it gives of performing an interdisciplinary work
(Page 1999, Axelrod 1997, Epstein and Axtell 1996).
To focus on the role of agent-based simulations in economics6, let
us consider the following deﬁnition given by Leigh Tesfatsion (2000),
one of the pioneers of ACE:
agent-based computational economics [...] is roughly deﬁned by
its practitioners as the computational study of economies modelled
as evolving systems of autonomous interacting agents. A principal
concern of ACE researchers is to understand the apparently spon-
taneous formation of global regularities in economic processes, such
as the unplanned coordination of trading activities in decentralized
market economies that economists associate with Adam Smith’s in-
visible hand. The challenge is to explain how these global regularities
4Epstein and Axtell 1996. According to the two authors, ”micro-simulation has more of
a ’top-down’ character since it models behavior via equations statistically estimated from
aggregate data, not as resulting from simple local rules.” I will get back to this point later on.
5Interestingly enough, the ancestor of modern object-oriented programming languages,
Simula, was developed at the beginning of Sixties precisely for simulation purposes. This kind
of technology revealed much powerful, and an object-oriented architecture characterises the
today most diﬀused programming languages as Java and C++.
6Some notes on the speciﬁcities of simulations in economics versus simulations in social
sciences can be found in Terna and Conte 2000.
3arise from the bottom up, through the repeated local interactions of
autonomous agents channeled through socioeconomic institutions,
rather than from the top-down imposition of ﬁctitious coordination
mechanisms such as market clearing constraints or an assumption of
single representative agents.
Forgetting for a while the ”C” of ACE, the ”study of economies
modelled as evolving systems of autonomous interacting agents” has
a long tradition in economics, being one of the main tenets — for in-
stance — of evolutionary economics, as Tesfatsion points out in her
guide to the literature. The research programme focusing on hetero-
geneity and interaction (H&I) has certainly many points of contact
with this approach, too. The same could be said about Austrian
economics. The point is that, strictly speaking, also general equi-
librium theory has an ”agent-based” nature. Is that ”C” the real
mark of the approach, then? Certainly not: The deﬁnition quoted
stressed some other points that are less common to, say, general
equilibrium theory. It is anyway a good point of departure.
A common practice used by scholars dealing with models whose
analytical solution is not one-way, is to substitute ”realistic” values
in the parameters and compute them numerically. It is a way of eval-
uate various features of a model, to test the relevance and sensitivity
of its implications, and to explore additional hypotheses7. With a
fully-ﬂedged ACE approach one can make this job more extensively,
getting much deeper into the problem studied. The change of the
functional form which deﬁnes the preferences of a consumer is as
immediate as that of the value of a parameter; the substitution of
that function with a procedure implementing some rule of thumb
is equally immediate; heterogeneity among agents, or out of equi-
librium dynamics are other topics easily handled. More in general,
once an analytical model has an ACE counterpart, many of the sim-
pliﬁcations usually made for the sake of tractability can be relaxed
quite easily, to ”see what happens”.
The added value lies here, in the possibility of growing into a com-
puter artiﬁcial markets where to test many extension the researcher
7As Judd points out (1997), even these opportunities are widely under-exploited. He
refers to the traditional tools developed within computational economics, presented both as
complements and as substitutes to theorem building. The arguments presented in this section
partially overlap to his work: At the end, some added value stems directly from the use of a pc.
In the following, however, I will focus mainly on the speciﬁcities of agent-based computation,
both with respect to theorem building and to traditional computational approaches.
4is interested in.
To be true, the access to these beneﬁts is not immediate, since
an ACE counterpart is not always available.
A ﬁrst case to cite, has to do with the class of models where we
know — by means of some ﬁxed-point theorem — that an equilib-
rium exists, but where we know — by means of some complexity
result — that the solution is not computable. In these cases, there
is no way of implementing the agents living in such models.
A second, somewhat weaker, impossibility, has to do with opti-
mal behaviour. The implementation of agents whose behaviour is
ruled by the (computable) maximisation of an intertemporal payoﬀ
function has some drawbacks. Let us assume that the optimisation
has, as a solution, a closed-form function of a given set of param-
eters. The simulation is feasible, but the beneﬁts we pointed out
in terms of ﬂexibility are hampered: A change in the assumptions
would typically require the re-writing of the model to solve a new
maximum problem. In other words, the simulation would grant a
little more than the computation of the model solution using ”re-
alistic values” for the parameters. On the other hand, when the
optimisation had not a closed-form solution, the behavioural rules
have to be approximated numerically. The simulation is still fea-
sible, and more traditional tools developed within computational
economics help doing this job. In an ACE framework, however,
a population of heterogeneous agents performing a (asynchronous)
numerical maximisation of an intertemporal payoﬀ function can eas-
ily give rise to simulations with a cumbersome architecture, hardly
providing hence easy to read results.
Someway, simulations behave as if they did’nt like textbook
models. Indeed, they are particularly suited for the study of markets
populated by individuals with bounded-rationality and interacting
with each other, and particularly for the study of their dynami-
cal behaviour. As Page puts it, ”Computational models enable the
study of complex, dynamic worlds because themselves are dynamic”
(1999).
In any case, if one is able to formulate a model where:
(1) The ”building blocks”, individuals or institutions, are modelled
as agents with a computable behaviour;
5(2) The dynamics of the model is deﬁned from ”the bottom up”,
thanks to a computable schedule where there is the explicit list
of the actions that will ”happen” in each time unit;
then, the analytical study is capable of being supported by an
ACE counterpart with which to test any extension the researcher is
interested in, compatible with requirements (1) and (2)8.
While the ﬁrst requirement does not imply a particular eﬀort,
the second one is someway at odds with more traditional modelling.
It simply requires, however, to substitute (or to add) to the formal
study of equilibrium conditions the writing down of the ordered list
of events that will actually happen, the market being in equilibrium
or not. The passage, is from the simultaneous equations style of
general equilibrium theory (and of celestial mechanics) to a story
telling style (quite typical in social sciences).
Summing up, ACE approach oﬀers to the scholars, particularly
— but not exclusively — to those interested in ﬁelds as bounded
rationality, H&I or non linear dynamics, a powerful tool that com-
plements more traditional formal reasoning with some added value
in terms of model testing and extendibility. The price required to
buy such beneﬁts is that the architecture of the model has to be
designed in a way compatible with its translation into a computable
procedure.
3 The challenge of complexity. Hayek’s expla-
nations of the principle
Till here, I gave a ”light” assessment of ACE capabilities in sup-
porting more traditional ways of doing research.
Now, I will address the question whether ACE modelling can be
considered a sound methodology of its own. We saw that a clear
way to point out the possible limits of a simulative approach is
8A proof of this proposition would account to no more than a tautology: The deﬁnition
of agents behaviour (and state variables), together with the choice of a starting point for the
ﬂow of agents’ actions are the necessary and suﬃcient elements of an agent-based computer
simulation. The computability of the simulation, i.e., the ﬁnite-time requirement for the
computation of an artiﬁcial time unit, is more diﬃcult to asses, particularly when the actions
of an agent can generate a cascade of other agents’ actions. Software packages like Swarm
heavily simplify the project of computable simulations, since a built-in management of the
schedule is provided (see www.swarm.org).
6by contrasting the anecdotic nature of its outputs with the view
that a ”scientiﬁc” explanation of a phenomenon should rest on its
reconduction to a law-like proposition. Does this latter view meet
with the speciﬁcities of economic research? Indeed, the answer rests
on one’s opinion about the main concern of Economics.
Simplifying a bit, we can contrast two such opinions. The ﬁrst
one is well exempliﬁed by Robbins’ classical deﬁnition: Economics
has to do with the allocation of scarce means to competing ends.
The search for the optimal allocation is a built-in feature of this
view; the natural toolbox is mathematics, and theorem building.
The second one can be traced back to the very origins of economic
research, and has had in Hayek one of its main partisans: Eco-
nomics has to do with the unwanted eﬀects of individual actions on
aggregate behaviour. Germane to this view is the stress on market
process, on aggregation, and on the complexity of the economic sys-
tem. There is not a natural toolbox for performing this study: The
historical analysis on the emergence of the QWERTY standard is a
nice example of a not ”theorem-oriented” one9.
As regards methodology, the ﬁrst view has a benchmark in Fried-
man’s The Methodology of Positive Economics (1953), even if his
positions, primarily in economic methodology literature, have been
widely contended 10. Without getting into details, theories are seen
mainly as ”ﬁling systems” with which to arrange knowledge, and as
instruments for making predictions. For the sake of the latter, one
can build its models — Friedman says must — using hypotheses
that are descriptively false. Models based on the assumption that
individuals behave as if they were optimisers is an example.
The second view has not a comparable standard. Many impor-
9As in Paul David (1985). In two classical papers, Paul J. McNulty traced back to Cournot
and Jevons the most important ”basic conceptual change” that lays behind the two visions
I sketched, namely, the passage from a view of competition as a behavioural activity to its
conception as a market structure (1967, 1968). Adam Smith ”did not conceive of competition
as a ’situation’ at all but, rather, as an active process leading to a certain predicted result.
The Smithian concept of competition is essentially one of business behavior [...] The concept
of competition originating with Cournot, on the other hand, is totally devoid of behavioural
content. This is because Cournot’s focus was entirely on the eﬀects, rather than the actual
workings, of competition” (McNulty 1967, 398).
10Hausman (1992) convincingly argued that mainstream methodological practice resembles
more closely Mill’s a priori inductive approach. Nevertheless, ”although confused, mistaken,
and inconsistent with the practice of mainstream economists” (Hausman, 1998), Friedman’s
views have been warmly embraced because of the ”protective belt” they put around the core
of neoclassical assumptions about individual’s rationality, and around Robbins’s identiﬁcation
of the ”allocation of scarse means” as the predominant causal factor of interest in economic
domain.
7tant insights, however, can be found in Hayek’s Studies in philoso-
phy, politics and economics, mainly in Degrees of Explanation (1955)
and The Theory of Complex Phenomena (1964).
His main point is that Economics methodology has to be clearly
distinguished from that of the so called ”hard” sciences, like Physics.
About the latter, he agrees with Popper in saying that the direction
of the explanatory path is from the ”known to the unknown”: Given
a known phenomenon, the task of the scientist is to discover the un-
known law by which it can be deduced and this way fully explained.
This job, however, ”presupposes conditions which are not present in
many other ﬁelds” (Hayek 1955, 5). Disciplines like Economics, or
Meteorology, force the scholar to a diﬀerent path:
they are, in a sense, derivative: they consist of deductions derived
from combinations of known laws of physics, and do not, strictly
speaking, state distinct laws of their own but elaborate the laws of
physics into explanatory patterns appropriate to the peculiar kind
of phenomena to which they refer (ivi, 6–7).
we shall here have to proceed in our deductions, not from the hy-
pothetical or unknown to the known and observable, but [...] from
the familiar to the unknown (ivi, 9).
The reasons for which the familiar knowledge we have on indi-
viduals’ behaviour ends up in an unknown macro outcome rests on
the complexity of economic systems. The edge that switches the
”reversal” of the explanatory path is certainly quite diﬃcult to de-
ﬁne. I would’nt dare to identify it — as Hayek does — in the fact
that physicians study phenomena where the ”number of signiﬁcantly
connected variables” is suﬃciently small. In relative terms, however,
the comparatione has sense. Murray Gell-Mann has been attributed
a nice posing of the matter: ”Imagine how hard physics would be if
electrons could think”11.
However we deﬁne it, it is the complexity of economic systems
that calls for a diﬀerent kind of investigation. We have a huge
knowledge on the actors and institutions of which the economy is
made. We know not to know many other ”pieces” of knowledge,
being them tacit, dispersed or hardly measurable. We know, ﬁnally,
that even simpler systems where autonomous agents interact with
11I due the anecdotic argument to Page (1999).
8each other can easily give rise to highly complex dynamics. The
”derivative” nature of the enquiry, then, has to be accompanied
by the tentative selection of the relevant items of this knowledge.
A reliable (scientiﬁc) explanation of the unwanted regularities that
emerge at the macro level will then rest on
whether we have selected the appropriate hypotheses from our store
of accepted statements and have combined them in the right manner
(ivi, 7).
we do not invent new hypotheses or constructs but merely select
them from what we know already about some of the elements of the
phenomena; in consequence we [ask] whether the factors we have
singled out are in fact present in the particular phenomena we want
to explain, and whether they are relevant and suﬃcient to explain
what we observe (ivi, 11).
We can stress two main features that according to Hayek charac-
terise a compositive methodology. The ﬁrst, is that the forecasting
capabilities it gives are open-ended and miss details, since we can ex-
plain, and hence predict, only kinds of phenomena. The knowledge
that one gets is knowledge of the principle of the things. Economics,
in this view, suﬀers of the same limits of Darwin’s evolutionary the-
ory: One can explain fairly well the advent and survival of a certain
organism, but as regards prediction he can point just to the kind of
phenomena that will probably happen12.
The second point worth noticing has to do with the ”realism”
of the building blocks of an explanation. Friedman’s suggestion
was that a theory ”must be descriptively false in its assumptions”
(Friedman 1953). Here, the precept is the opposite: One should not
invent new hypotheses, but ”merely select” them from the store of
accepted knowledge about a phenomenon.
I will try to reﬁne both conclusions later on — the precept of
”realism”, in particular, is somewhat a severe one. Anyway, the
”core” of the arguments put forth by Hayek is suﬃcient to proceed,
investigating whether ACE can play a role in this view of scientiﬁc
explanation.
12Not to talk about long term forecasting: In the long term ﬁshes can start to ﬂy. It
is of some interest how Hayek drives from these limits his personal view of policy making.
”Knowledge of the principle of the thing will enable us to make circumstances more favourable
to the kinds of events we desire [...] Such activities [...] should perhaps better be described
by the term cultivation than by the familiar ’control’” (Hayek 1955, 19).
94 Was Hayek an ACE?
We now have an instance of why the traditional law-like view of sci-
entiﬁc explanation is not inevitable. As Hayek put it, the ”deriva-
tive” nature of the research, and the complexity of economic sys-
tems, have as a typical output something more qualitative: We have
explanations of the principle, the reconstruction of the explanatory
patterns that lead to certain kind of phenomena.
As regards the modelling strategy, this reconstruction will con-
sist in the ”selection” of some elements from the mess, and in the
investigation of the result of their interaction.
Is ACE a suitable way of performing this kind of research? Some
insights have recently been given by Vriend, in a paper where he
addressed the question whether Hayek could be considered an ACE
avant-la-lettre (1999). As for as the topics investigated, he points to
the many themes typical of the Austrian economist present in ACE
literature — from his view of the economy as a complex evolving
system, to the stress on the narrow limits of human reason, on rule-
based behaviours, and on the processes of knowledge diﬀusion. As
regards the approach, he argues that ACE research can be consid-
ered an application of Hayek’s methodological insights.
One of his main stresses is in the fact that simulations are models
with which to represent economic systems, in that they are abstrac-
tion from reality. To them, hence, can be applied Hayek’s insights
on the status of models in economic reasoning. Mainly, the fact that
they are hardly veriﬁable, if not by means of consistency checks be-
tween the models’ outcomes and the phenomena under investigation:
social theory is explanation, and explanation means modeling. Mod-
els can be presented in various forms. They could be either purely
verbal or quantitative, where quantitative models, in turn, might be
a set of mathematical expressions or a set of computer instructions.
That is, a computer program as used in ACE constitutes a model.
And since explanation is modeling, and this is what social theory is
all about, an ACE computer program as such is social theory. The
only, and essential, reason to execute the computer program is to
carry out the consistency checks. (Vriend 1999, 31-32).
The point is not trivial. Computer languages are not ”outliers”
in scientiﬁc reasoning: They are just one of the symbol systems
10available to the social scientist (Gilbert and Terna 2000, Ostrom
1988). It should be noted, however, that to clarify that computer
languages are among the symbolic systems available to build models
is not suﬃcient to assess the methodological relevance of that kind
of models. Also paintings are abstractions of reality, but they are
hardly relevant models for the economist — while it plainly could
be the case to the historian, think of Guernica.
More precisely, it is true that explaining implies some sort of
modelling, and that simulations are a suitable language to do this
job. But for a model to become a relevant explanation we need some
more steps: We need a ”template” of what we bear for a scientiﬁc
explanation, and the check that our model ﬁts with the template. A
clariﬁcation of this point, together with the arguments given in pre-
vious section, will be suﬃcient to reinforce Vriend’s parallel between
ACE models and Hayek insights.
Consider, as an example, whether a certain model can be used
to build a proposition A coherent with the ”covering law” view of
scientiﬁc explanation. The ﬁrst check is that A, and hence the
model encapsulated in A, has to be written in an appropriate lan-
guage. The second check is about syntax, and requires that A has
the following template: ”L
T
P ) E”, where L (the model) states
a general law, P is a proposition asserting the presence of particular
events, and E is the explanandum — the proposition stating the fact
that has to be explained. The last check has to do with semantic,
and requires for A to be passible of an empirical test. The check,
under this view, requires that P and E were propositions with an
empirical content, i.e., of which we can ascertain whether they are
”true” or ”false”. If all the checks have been passed, then we can
say that A is a (in principle falsiﬁable) scientiﬁc explanation.
As regards the relevance question about a simulative model, then,
once we have recognised that it has been written in a suitable lan-
guage, there are two more points to be addressed. The ﬁrst, is the
formal check: Is our model an instance of what we bear for a ”sci-
entiﬁc explanation”? The important contribution of Hayek, that
I synthesised in previous step, is that when addressing a certain
kink of phenomena, a suitable explanation may consist in ’putting
together’ something that we know about the phenomenon and see
which kind of aggregate behaviour emerge. And simulations can do
that job.
11This way, we produce the following hypothesis: The structure
of relations that we built — and not the quantitative connection
between micro and macrobehaviour — is akin to the principle at
work in the real world.
The second point to be addressed, then, is how to test this hy-
pothesis13. The hints we can derive from Hayek point to something
by necessity qualitative. If the aggregate behaviour emerging by our
model is (not) consistent with what we observe in reality, then we
will have an evidence corroborating (disconﬁrmating) the relevance
of the factors we selected.
It should be clear then, that agent-based simulations with a suf-
ﬁciently clean design are certainly a way of implementing such a
compositive kind of investigation14, and that under this view they
are well formed scientiﬁc explanation of the phenomena studied.
The power of the explanatory pattern hypothesised will not rest
in the statement of a ”well-behaved” law with which to deduce a
general class of occurrences, but in the anecdotic evidence that the
certain set of assumptions that has been singled out is suﬃcient to
generate the emerging behaviour. This is not a direct conﬁrmation
that we grasped the ”true” causal mechanisms, but if we have been
able to mimic the regularities observed, says Hayek, ”there is good
reason to regard the model as exhibiting the principle at work in
the more complex phenomenon”.
Needless to say, simulations are just the last-comers among the
possible instantiation of the methodological insights of Hayek; ver-
bal reasoning such as a mathematically formalised one are sound
competitors. The relation between ACE and Hayekian views, more-
over, is not that of an inclusion. To proceed in our investigation,
then, we have to relax the link we traced with Hayek’s insights and
generalise some of the hints given.
13Vriend reports a rather pessimistic view of Hayek on this matter: ”a simple theory of
phenomena which are in their nature complex [...] is probably of necessity false” (Vriend
1999, p. 30). The quote is from The theory of complex phenomena.
14The clear design is again a crucial requirement. As Kirman and Vriend put it, ”when
modeling by building artiﬁcial worlds, one might get a very good ﬁt without gaining under-
standing. There exist economic simulation models with more than 10,000 variables. At some
point it might be that one mainly succeeds in building a copy of the real world, about which
we have the same degree of understanding as about the real world.”, mimeo, quoted in Vriend
1999).
125 The methodological status of agent-based sim-
ulations
In the arguments given so far I left (at least) three points somewhat
sketched. The ﬁrst relates to the conception of scientiﬁc enquiry as
a mean to drive predictions. What about simulations? We saw that,
as for evolutionary theory, the link between a suitable explanation
and prediction can be weak. We saw also that, this notwithstanding,
it is conceivable to turn an explanation of the principle into policy
indications in a ”cultivation” style15. The point to be addressed
here is more general, and regards what can be called the pragmatic
content of theories.
Secondly, it is not obvious which is the logical structure (the tem-
plate) of what Hayek called ”explanations of the principle”. More
in general, a clariﬁcation of the logical structure of a simulative
approach is essential to assess the relations between this kind of
theorising and empirical tests.
Finally, I based my arguments on a partial reconstruction of
Hayek’s methodological positions, and this way a key role has been
played by the realism of assumptions, by their selection from a ”store
of accepted statements”. To a certain extent, this might not be a
limit: Strictly speaking, in that store we could even ﬁnd some as
if assumptions, provided that, say, the maximising behaviour of
individuals could be considered an accepted conception. The sub-
jectivist approach that can be recognised in all Hayekian research,
however, stays at odds with this interpretation. To impose the real-
ism of assumptions, therefore, can be demanding; moreover, it does
not match with ACE practice: A growing strand of ACE literature
is focusing on the dynamics emerging in artiﬁcial markets populated
with zero-intelligence agents. If we agree that this is not a realistic
assumption, a brief discussion on the theme is needed.
In this section, I will ﬁrst tackle with these points discussing two
topics essential for my goals: That of abductive inference, and that
of the realism of assumptions. In the last paragraph I will cast the
arguments given into some results of modern theory of abductive
inference, providing this way a framework that helps clarify the
logical status of simulations and their role as causal explanation
of economic phenomena.
15See footnote 12.
135.1 Abductive inference and the pragmatic content of the-
ories
To address the ﬁrs two points, it is useful a brief digression on a
logical and philosophical background that characterise agent-based
modelling, and that is seldom recognised. Curiously enough, one of
the ”main enemies” of ACE partisans, Friedman’s as-if construal,
can be traced back to roughly the same philosophical roots. Let us
start from this latter.
In the received view, the so-called ”symmetry principle” between
explanation and prediction holds, since they both refer to the same
syllogism ”L
T
P ) E”: Given E, its explanation consists in show-
ing its link with a law L and the particular conditions P; if we bear
a law L for true, on the other hand, the occurrence of P allows us to
predict that E will happen. Where this principle were true, we had
a clear link between positive economics and policy indications; in
Auguste Comte words, ”Science hence prediction, prediction hence
action.”
As a matter of fact, the stress on the forecasting role of theories
typical of the approach put forth by Friedman is all but marginal.
What about the roots of this approach? The ﬁrst comprehensive
attempt to clarify the underlying philosophy of The Methodology
of Positive Economics is due to Boland (1979,). He recognised in
Friedman’s view the main tenets of instrumentalism, a term coined
by John Dewey to tell his methodological lecture of Charles Sander
Peirce’s pragmatism from the metaphysical one given by philoso-
phers like William James or Ferdinand Schiller16.
The key feature of this approach is well clariﬁed by Popper: ”By
instrumentalism I mean the doctrine that a scientiﬁc theory [...]
should be interpreted as an instrument, and nothing but an in-
strument, for the deduction of predictions of future events” (1983,
237)17.
16In turn, to tell his views from the both, Peirce coined the term ”pragmaticism”. See Rossi
(1986, 234-235), Apel (1981), Abbagnano (1968, ad vocem). On the attribution of these roots
to Friedman’s positions agrees also Mark Blaug: ”in fact he owes more to John Dewey than
to Karl Popper: he is a pragmatist rather than a falsiﬁcationist” (1992, 104). Interestingly
enough, however, the as-if argument has originally been proposed by a philosopher of the
”metaphysical” wing, Hans Vaihinger, in his Die Philosophie des Als Ob (The philosophy of
as-if, 1911).
17Compare also Feyerabend: ”the view that scientiﬁc theories are instruments of prediction
which do not possess any descriptive meaning” (1981, 144). Roughly the same deﬁnition is
used by Boland in its arguments.
14Peirce’s pragmatism, however, was less demanding. Simplifying a
bit, the idea that theories have an ”instrumental” value stems from
his view that the meaning of any conception consists in its use. In
this broader sense, to limit the pragmatic content of a theory to
the ”deduction of predictions of future events” is all but inevitable,
under two respects.
The ﬁrst one has to do with the ”use” of a theory as an ex-
planatory tool. If the symmetry principle hold, there would be
no questions. To the extent that an explanation should intelligibly
answer to a question ”why”, however, there may be a trade oﬀ be-
tween explanatory power and forecasting capabilities. Consider for
instance the following theory L: ”Macroeconomic time series fol-
low an AR(1) data generating process”. Given a certain value of a
macroeconomic variable E, its explanation will amount to compute
the ”particular conditions” P, in the form of the parameters of the
autoregressive process that best ﬁt the time series of that macroe-
conomic variable. With this theory at hand, predictions of future
events are possible, but the question ”Why is this happening?” has
not been answered. On the opposite, it is also conceivable a purely
idiosyncratic explanation, in the form of the historical reconstruc-
tion of the causal chain that produced E. Here, we still (implicitly)
use some ”laws”, with a form like ”in such circumstances, these facts
usually occurs”; but the possibilities of drawing predictions are par-
ticularly weak. To the extent that we recognise a per se value to an
explanation, we use theories to clarify phenomena whichever their
forecasting power.
About the use of our knowledge by means of deductive syllo-
gisms, moreover, Peirce argued that this kind of inference is the less
frequent in ordinary reasoning, and just one of the possibilities in
scientiﬁc investigation. Prior to Peirce contributions, logicians com-
monly divided arguments into two classes: Deductive arguments
(a.k.a. necessary inferences), and inductive arguments (a.k.a. prob-
able inference). A most important tenet of Pierce’s pragmatism
resides in the stress he put in another form of probable inference,
that he called abduction (or retroduction, or hypothesis). Techni-
cally, abduction is the inference of the minor premise P from the
explanandum and the general law: ”L
T
E ! P”.
A clear way to look at abduction is in sampling theory. Let the
three items of a syllogism be the following:
15L ´ ”All beans in urn A are white”;
P ´ ”The beans of sample s have been drawn from A”;
E ´ ”The beans of sample s are white”.
Deduction is the (necessary) inference of E by L and P. Induc-
tion is the (probable) inference of the rule L by E and P. Abduction,
is the (probable) inference from L and E to the case P. Knowing
that the beans of sample s are white, and that all beans in urn A
are white, we hypothesise (abduce) that s has been drawn from A.
In the years, he extended this early characterisation of inference
forms into a broader view of the scientiﬁc method, which main fea-
tures are the three steps abduction-deduction-induction, together
with what he called the ”economics of research” (Burch 2001). Ab-
duction became deﬁned as inference to, and provisional acceptance
of, an explanatory hypothesis; that is, inference to something that
clariﬁes or makes routine some information that has previously been
surprising: ”The surprising fact, E, is observed, but if P were true,
E would be a matter of course, hence there is reason to suspect that
P is true”18. The provisional nature of this belief stems from the
fact that something else could explain E, and that the causal link
between P and E might not be necessary.
In the Seventies, Harry Pople (1973) pointed out the importance
of abduction to the literature on artiﬁcial intelligence, and from then
on it has been applied to ﬁelds like medical diagnosis, natural lan-
guage understanding, plan recognition, and many others (McIlraith
1998; Menzies and Gambetta 1994). To the economists, probably
the most interesting case is that of signals extraction: The diﬀusion
of knowledge via price signals is exactly the inference of an infor-
mation (for instance, the rise in the proﬁtability of a ﬁrm) from the
observation of the typical eﬀects of the information abduced (in the
example, the rise in the ﬁrm’s stock price). A rational investor has
no way to deduce that a rise in the proﬁtability of the ﬁrm has oc-
curred. But, since a rise in the stock price is a typical eﬀect of a
ﬁrm’s proﬁt chances increase, it can be used to hypothesise that its
proﬁtability has actually risen.
18Peirce (1955); I changed the lettering for ease of readability. The term ”suspect” has a
particular ﬁt: Probably the most famous example of the abductive inference of explanations
is that of Conan Doyle’s Sherlock Holmes.
16These examples can be relevant when we model an agent be-
haviour. The point to be stressed here, however, stand somewhat
at a higher level. Namely, abduction is a key step also in scientiﬁc
theory formation and validation (Thagard 1988). When we ask why
a certain phenomenon occurs, we will typically proceed ’putting to-
gether’ a constellation of possible causal factors, trying to reproduce
the phenomenon observed. The acceptance of a hypothesis, the the-
ory validation, is based on how well it reproduces the evidence, and
on other criterions — such as the simplicity, or some measure of
plausibility of the explanation — with which to compare competing
explanations. A modern synonym for abduction, i.e. inference to
the best explanation, well reﬂects this research path.
Concluding, the stress on the ”deduction of predictions of future
events” germane to the instrumentalist as-if construal has certainly
sound bases: It stems from the need, ”built-in” in scientiﬁc reason-
ing, of producing conceptions with a pragmatic content. However,
the pragmatic content of scientiﬁc knowledge can typically resides
elsewhere, namely, in its use via abductive inference to build ex-
planatory patterns that may or may not have an immediate ”sur-
plus” of forecasting power.
We can turn now to discuss which kind of hypotheses we can buy
in our ”store of accepted statements”.
5.2 The realism of assumptions
Its old age notwithstanding, the quarrel about the realism of as-
sumptions has not yet arrived to a sharp solution. The many tricks
that it hides can be clariﬁed starting with the following distinction
proposed by Machlup:
one must distinguish two kinds of protest against lack of realism:
ﬁrst, that certain realistic assumptions were omitted [...]; second,
that the assumptions made were unrealistic.19
Let’s say that Hayek would endorse at most the ﬁrst form of
”unrealism”, while Friedmann is a supporter of the second one20.
Hayek tells us: You certainly have to ignore some factors present
in the system you are studying, but the other building blocks of
19Machlup 1978, p. 78.
20Needless to say, the opinions of both authors that I will report are a raw proxy of the
originals.
17your theory must conform with what you know about that system’s
elements. Friedmann tells us: You do not have to look into the black
box, the only thing that matters are the outcomes of your theory.
Let us try to follow Hayek’s suggestion, for instance, while build-
ing some model of unemployment. Let us omit the explicit consid-
eration of, say, money and politicians: The only actors of our model
will be ﬁrms and households. The approach we are adhering to,
impose us to make realistic assumptions about them. The point is:
What is a realistic assumption, for instance, about a household? If
we are not in an experimental economics department, we will have
to use a model of it. To build a realistic model of a household,
our approach allows us to omit some relevant factors that aﬀect
households’ behaviour, but all the other assumptions that we make
about them have to be realistic. Let us say that we omit the ex-
plicit consideration of gender diﬀerences, and that we model our
family simply as the union of a variable number of individuals with
a unique, common budget. Our rule says that we are allowed to do
this, but the individuals we use have to be realistic. And since we
are not in an experimental economics department, we are obliged
to postpone again our ”realistic check” and deliver it on the model
we will choose to represent them. And the game starts again. The
point is, that we always have to code in some way the objects we are
studying, and hence the problem of ”realism” will recursively reap-
pear inside any assumption we make. The best place where we can
end up, following blindly this approach, is in a gloomy reductionism:
the explanation of everything is always in some deeper layer.
Have we to endorse the ”black box” approach to eventually stop
this loop? It is not that simple. A widely recognised stylised fact
about economists’ eﬀorts to account for that share of active popu-
lation that has not a job, is that there are many competing theories
which do possess some ﬁt on the data. To impose that each of these
theories is a black box where it is forbidden to look into seems a bit
punishing, since some scrutiny of the assumptions could at least in
principle helps us in the choice among the competitors. To strictly
adhere to the black box approach, in other terms, could easily leads
us in another gloomy place, where the explanation of everything can
be very smart, but is somewhere you can not look at.
If it were possible to investigate any subject in an experimental
manner, or if it were always possible to choose between competing
18theories thanks to clear answers from a dataset, one of the two
approaches would be suitable. As it seems, that is not the case.
As Hausman put it, we have not yet solved Mill’s problem (1992,
1998). From one side, Economics has characteristics of ”separate-
ness” that justify the adoption of idealised assumptions, unrealis-
tic in some strong sense. On the other side, any pure theory con-
ﬂicts with the ”inexact” nature of real world economic relations.
Given the diﬃcult interplay between theory and empirical evidence,
a scrutiny of the single assumptions adopted seems unavoidable21.
When we do not overstate the scope of applicability of economic
theorems, however, Hausman’s restatement of Mill’s problem pro-
vides a useful clariﬁcation of their limits: In the case we recognise a
certain degree of conformity of our assumptions to what is there in
the real world, an economic law will tell us which are the tendencies
that will be at work.
A similar position has recently been endorsed by Robert Sugden
(2000). He analysed some ”high level” features of two papers that,
as he says, nearly all economists would be glad to have in their list
of publications: Akerlof’s The Market for ’Lemons’, and Schelling’s
Dynamic Models of Segregation. Both works share an apparent con-
tradiction: Their authors point to some real world facts that are
very closed to what they study, but nevertheless they do not pre-
tend to explain any empirical evidence. They present their work as a
highly idealised one, without using the highly idealised language we
would expect in the presentation of a pure formal system. The con-
tradiction vanishes when considering that both works pointed out
the potential eﬀects of causal factors that can rarely be observed in
isolation, but nonetheless can be essential to fully comprehend real
world situation in which the tendencies they identify are at work.
If we consider suﬃciently fair this vision of what economists really
do when they put together various assumptions, we should recognise
21Mill’s own solution was to consider what we usually call ”ﬁrst principles” as ”last prin-
ciples”, hence considering the scrutiny of assumptions a sort of fundamental step that give
them the status, with respect to the rest of economic theory, of a priori truth. ”Instead of
being the ﬁxed point from whence the chain of proof which supports all the rest of the science
hang suspended, they are themselves the remotest link of the chain. Though presented as if
all other truths were to be deduced from them, they are the truths which are last arrived at;
the result of the last stage of generalization, or of the last and subtlest process of analysis,
to which the particular truths of the science can be subjected; those particular truths having
been previously been ascertained by the evidence proper to their own nature.” (1974, 88).
19to simulations a better equilibrium between pros and cons than that
I used at the beginning of the paper.
In particular, a computer simulation can be considered a way of
delivering experimental evidence, since — tipically — economists
are not interested only in the behaviour of ”real” individuals, but
also in the eﬀects of some idealised behaviour. In sociologists terms,
we study roles, not persons, and roles can fairly be coded into rules
and other formal stuﬀ: Actually, it is what most economists do. By
the same token, they can be coded into ”pieces of software”, and
in this way they can be observed during an experiment about some
topic of interest.
It is not in the capability of simulations of managing realistic
agents or institutions that resides their ﬁrst added value, but in the
fact that they can bring the more or less realistic assumptions made
by a scholar into a laboratory to test in a ”controlled way” their
outcomes. This laboratory is a ”true” laboratory, in the limits that
we consider economics as a separate discipline handling with the
eﬀects of just some idealised aspects of economic behaviour.
5.3 The simulative route to causal explanations
I started this paper with a sharp contrast between a law-chasing
approach to economic reasoning and the anecdotic outcomes of agent
based simulations. I proceeded showing a possible point of contact
among the two approaches, and discussing other topics relevant to
the clariﬁcation of their logical status. To close the argument, I
will now proceed showing to which kind of questions both ACE and
traditional modelling are suitable methodologies to answer to. Once
the two approaches are this closer, it will be possible to appreciate
also their diﬀerent features.
As regards law chasing, I pointed out that when the concern is
on market process more than on equilibrium outcomes, and in the
aggregation of individual behaviours more than on optimal alloca-
tion problems, we will typically end up with something more fuzzy
than general laws. As a mnemonic, call this kind of questions ”fuzzy
questions”. The fact that our output can not be a precise law does
not imply that algebra is not a suitable language with which to ex-
plore these matters. It simply means that the ”laws” that we ﬁnd
20out have to be considered like qualitative statements about struc-
ture of relations, without a precise quantitative content. Both Hayek
and Keynes already pointed out this fact. According to the former,
the knowledge that resides in any model about complex phenomena
rests in the ”certain range of phenomena which can be produced by
the type of situation which it represents. [Such a model] will con-
tain assertions about a structure of relations even if we do not know
the value of any of the variables.”22 Theories, then, are ”destined
to remain ’algebraic’, because we are in fact unable to substitute
particular values for the variables, [and cease] then to be a mere
tool and becomes the ﬁnal result of our theoretical eﬀorts.”23 In a
letter to Harrod about the role of econometrics, Keynes expressed
roughly the same concept:
In chemistry and physics and other natural sciences the object of
the experiment is to ﬁll in the actual values of the various quantities
and factors appearing in an equation or a formula; and the work
when done is once and for all. In economics that is not the case,
and to convert a model into a quantitative formula is to destroy its
usefulness as an instrument of thought.24
The arguments of Hausman and Sugden that I reported in last
section point in the same direction: At the end, once we abandon
the pretention of arriving to golden rules everywhere and every time
applicable, theorem building can be viewed simply as an analytical
engine with which to build causal links between a certain stylised
aspect of economic systems and some aggregate outcomes. In a
sense, the generality of an economic theorem is just a byproduct of
the peculiar tool we used to recognise a causal relation.
As a matter of fact, one of the early critiques that have been
raised to the covering law approach, by authors like David Scriven
or Wesley Salmon, is that it missed to recognise to the concept of
causality its key role in scientiﬁc explanation25. The shift of focus
has important consequences, since when we put the causality at the
centre of the stage the requisite of providing universal arguments is
no more an essential one.
22Hayek 1955, p. 15, emphasis added.
23Hayek 1964, p. 28.
24Reprinted in Hausman 1994 p. 301.
25See Scriven (1962, 1963) and Salmon (1984). A wide synthesis on the history of the
concept of causality can be found in Laudisa (1999). For the relations between causality and
the D-N model see Salmon (1990).
21As a ﬁrst approximation, we can say that for a certain factor P to
be recognised as the cause of an explanandum E we simply need to
show that P is a suﬃcient condition for E to happen. The suﬃciency
of P, then, can be recognised by means of a formal analysis, but can
also be ascertained in machina: If P is suﬃcient to generate E as
an outcome, this will be the case also in a simulation. The anecdotic
nature of the evidence produced, indeed, does not infringe the causal
link recognised, since for the latter to be veriﬁed we need just the
experiment to be replicable.
Actually, it is possible to conceive of causality also in terms of a
necessary relation, and in this case some law like statement would
again be essential. John L. Mackie (1962), proposed an explication
of the concept capable of clarifying the role both of the necessary
and the suﬃcient conditions. He considered the case of a ﬁre in a
building, of which a short circuit is recognised as the cause. In gen-
eral, a short circuit can not be considered a necessary condition for
a ﬁre, since many other factors can start it. Neither it can be con-
sidered a suﬃcient one, since it can happen, say, far from ﬂammable
materials. How should we interpret, then, the proposition ”The ﬁre
has been caused by a short circuit?”. Mackie proposed the following
explication: First, even if a short circuit is not a suﬃcient condition
for a ﬁre, it came with a set S of events that, as a whole, is a suﬃ-
cient (even if not necessary) condition for a ﬁre. Second, the short
circuit is an essential element (a necessary one) of the set S, mean-
ing that, without it, the set S will no more be a suﬃcient condition
for a ﬁre. With somewhat a short circuit of words, he proposed to
consider the short circuit an Insuﬃcient condition, Necessary to an
Unnecessary but Suﬃcient condition for a ﬁre to happen; in a word,
an Inus condition.
Typically, even if we are unable to provide deﬁnitive laws about
fuzzy questions, we can give them provisional answers looking for
some Inus conditions. Consider the question ”What causes busi-
ness ﬂuctuations?”. A possible answer, is to show analytically that
random shocks, together with some adjustment mechanisms, are a
suﬃcient condition for business ﬂuctuations to arise. Neither the
random shock alone, nor the deterministic part of the model, are
suﬃcient to generate ﬂuctuations, and on the other side cycles can
emerge also as a consequence of other causes. With a simulation
one can do pretty the same job. With a lower degree of generality,
22they nevertheless provide a suitable explanation for the phenomenon
observed.
What are, then, the diﬀerences? In what agent based simulations
can provide additional insights? In order to answer, it is useful to
recall the Peircean notion of abduction, providing a modern formali-
sation of it. Following Bylander at al. (1991), I will use the following
notation. d stands for a datum, e.g., a fact to be explained, and D
stands for a set of data. h stands for an individual hypothesis, e.g.,
a causal factor, and H stands for a set of hypotheses, or a com-
posite hypothesis. We can now give the following formalisation of
abduction, or of inference to a best explanation.
An abduction problem is a tuple hDall;Hall;e;pli, where:
Dall is a ﬁnite set of all the data to be explained;
Hall is a ﬁnite set of all the individual hypotheses;
e is a map from subsets of Hall to subsets of Dall (Hall explains
e(Hall));
pl is a map from subsets of Hall to a partially ordered set;
pl can be viewed as a measure of plausibility, of belief, or of
relevance given to the causal factor. We will say that:
H is complete if it explains all the data, i.e. if e(H) = Dall;
H is parsimonious if no proper subset of H explains all the
data that H does;
H is an explanation if it is complete and parsimonious;
H is a best explanation if no other explanation is more plausible
than H, i.e., it does not exist a H0 6= H : pl(H0) > pl(H). It
is only ”a best” because of the partial order imposed to H:
Hence, there can be several best explanations.
A clear way to think of this kind of inference is in medical diag-
nosis. The sets D are collections of symptoms, while the set Hall is
the collection of all the causal factors that produce some symptom
in the organism. We can think of scientiﬁc research as the activity
of ﬁlling up the set Hall and keeping up to date the map e, with the
23list of symptoms produced by the new causal factors we are adding.
The diagnosis, is the use of this knowledge to infer an explanation
to a certain set Dall of symptoms observed in a patient.
In economics, such a clear distinction is not possible, since we
unfortunately have not a ”neutral” organism linking a causal factor
in isolation with its outcomes; say, a certain production function
with the level of output. For the sake of simplicity, however, let us
assume that we already have a received view on some basic features
of the ”economic organism”, and on its ”normal” functioning. We
can think, for instance, that a ”healthy” economy is one with ﬁrms
and individuals perfectly rational and informed, with given technol-
ogy and tastes, that is developing along an optimal growth path.
The ”diseases” d range from diﬀerent technologies and tastes, ex-
ogenous dynamics for some relevant variables, market imperfections,
information asymmetries, anomalous (not rational) behaviours and
so on. For each of these, we are interested in which are the ”symp-
toms” they produce, i.e., the modiﬁcations to the normal behaviour
of our healthy economy.
Here, we can ﬁnd a ﬁrst diﬀerence between theorem building and
simulations. If we are smart enough, with some algebra we can
ascertain the eﬀects of all the elements of a (large) subset H at a
time. For instance, the eﬀects on the benchmark behaviour of an
entire class of diﬀerent technologies. If the algebra does not help
us — and we are smart enough — we can turn to simulations and
ascertain the eﬀects of some additional factors, but just few at a
time. The diﬀerence is: Algebra is the coup´ ee, and simulations are
the jeep. Theorem building has a high productivity in parsing the
territory Hall, simulations allow us to go beyond and investigate
some additional h.
Consider now the other task, the ”diagnosis”. We observed a
phenomenon D, and we want a best explanation to it. In this case,
we have to explore our set Hall looking for a condition h suﬃcient
to give rise to D. The ﬁrst thing to say is that, if we do not ﬁnd a
single h : e(h) = D, it is probable that we are already facing a fuzzy
question. In fact, as a next step we must try various h together,
hoping to ﬁnd a composite hypothesis suﬃcient to give rise to D.
The point is, that typically there is some non trivial interaction
between various h, where ”trivial” means that the factors considered
are not mutually exclusive, and that their eﬀects are additive. If
24the interaction among the h is not trivial, Bylander at al. (1991)
provide an interesting complexity result. They show that in general
the exploration of the set Hall becomes an NP-hard procedure: In
other words, the search for a best explanation is a not computable
task.
How is it that we usually keep many economic models for ”good”
explanations, then? A provisional answer, rests on the hypotheses
we make about the set Hall and its relations with what I called a
benchmark, ”healthy” economy. In principle, economic theory has
as outcomes not only the mapping between the sets H and D, but
also many restrictions on the plausible hypotheses h. That is to say,
that the set Hall that we have to parse can be reasonably small, and
hence, even if the search for a best explanation is potentially long,
its eﬀective duration is limited by the small number of alternative
hypotheses that we are willing to consider. On the other hand,
however, the benchmark to which I referred is not a datum, since
we are not interested only in the eﬀects of single causal factors,
but, so to speak, in the mechanism linking this factor to certain
outcomes.
To turn the formalisation adopted into a fair portrait of how
works scientiﬁc explanation in economics, then, we can say the fol-
lowing. The hypotheses we adopt about the mechanism — in the
metaphor, about the normal working of the economic ”organism”
— is a matter of research programme selection. That is to say, we
choose a hard core of hypotheses H¤ that works as a basic frame-
work, and do ”normal science” studying the eﬀects of a fairly limited
number of additional hypotheses and initial conditions. The partial
ordering pl, hence, is deﬁned only among the sets H that includes
H¤. Due to the limited number of the elements among which an
order relation is deﬁned, a best explanation, provided that an ex-
planation at all exists, can in principle be found.
Here is the second diﬀerence between traditional modelling and
agent based simulations. The clause ”for the sake of tractability”
has, as a by product, the limitation of the scope of composite hy-
potheses that one can test. If we add to this the adoption of a
reference framework (a hard core) of hypotheses about the main
features of the system studied, the inference to a best explanation
about a certain phenomenon is a well deﬁned task; somehow, the po-
tential complexity/uncomputability of spanning a wider domain is
25avoided by deﬁnition. Needless to say, however, it is not a mechani-
cal task: An innovative theory is often based on the identiﬁcation of
a new relevant factor h more than on the mechanical recombination
of what is at the stake in the literature.
With an agent based simulation, the high level target is the same:
To ﬁnd out a set H that is an Inus condition for the emergency of a
pattern D. The logical structure of the explanation provided, hence,
can fairly be considered the same. The task, however, is a more
complex one under two respects. On one side, we are driving a jeep,
and the span of alternative hypotheses is slower. The clause ”for the
sake of tractability”, moreover, is no more active, and the search for
a best explanation can easily end up in a NP-hard intractability.
From a methodological point of view, then, agent based models
can have a potentially low explanatory power not because of a lower
degree of generality, but because of the higher degrees of freedom
they grant in the combination of elementary causal factors. This
freedom, ends up in a more diﬃcult comparison with alternative
patterns of explanation.
An essential step in fostering an agent based approach, hence,
is the adoption of a plausibility measure pl alleviating the compu-
tational requirements necessary to the exploration of the set Hall.
Not surprisingly, such a rule has spontaneously evolved in the lit-
erature. From Axelrod’s simplicity principle to the literature on
zero-intelligence agents, one of the main tenets of ACE is the eﬀort
to give rise to macrobehaviours with ”minimal” requirements to the
rationality of the agents and to the architecture of the simulations.
Epstein (1999) stressed this point stating a sort of ﬁrst principle
to a research programme: ”The point is not how much rationality
there is at the microlevel, but how little is enough to generate the
macroequilibrium”.
This sort of commitment to simplicity can play a role similar
to the ”for the sake of tractability” clause: It reduces the number
of potential patterns of explanations to be considered. Hence, it
deﬁnes both a research programme and some feasible limits within
which a suitable explanation can be looked for.
Even if the simplicity of a simulation has this key role, the degrees
of freedom a scholar has in spanning the possible interactions among
diﬀerent causal factors h-s are obvious.
265.4 Concluding remarks
I started with a sharp contrast, and ended with two similar worlds.
The points of similarity between a ”traditional” approach and a sim-
ulative one can be synthesised in the following: Both are concerned
with some idealised portrait of economic agents/institutions; both
are a way to discover causal linkages between this idealised individ-
ual behaviour and aggregate outcomes; both face the same poten-
tially uncomputable task of ﬁnding a ”best explanation”, according
to some plausibility measure; both overcome this complexity self
deﬁning the limits within which to test (to experiment) additional
hypothesis.
The main diﬀerences, from a methodological point of view, rest in
the way the ﬁrst two points are handled. The cause chasing, within
an algebraic approach, typically ends up with a system of equations
deﬁning the structure of relations that grasps — even in a simul-
taneous way — the causal linkages between the diﬀerent elements.
The ”soundness” of these linkages is granted by the generality of
the results obtained. Within a simulative approach, the structure of
relations is built from the bottom up, in a more explicit way. The
soundness of the causal links pointed out rests on the replicability
of the experiment.
From a practical point of view, the diﬀerences are the ”usual”
ones. The trade oﬀ is between general results in an elegant packag-
ing, and experimental evidence, sometimes more diﬃcult to inter-
pret, but much wider in the scope it gives to the research.
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